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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY (U 904 G)

PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICARDO GONZALEZ

(AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STRUCTURE)

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

April 2019

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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICARDO GONZALEZ (AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STRUCTURE)

I. INTRODUCTION

My testimony presents a proposal for an updated authorized capital structure for Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas). The authorized capital structure refers to the capital ratios of three components: (1) Long-Term Debt, (2) Preferred Equity (*i.e.*, Preferred Stock), and (3) Common Equity. The capital ratios, in conjunction with the proposed embedded costs (defined later) associated with the three components, determine the weighted-average cost of capital or authorized Rate of Return (ROR). Table 1 below shows SoCalGas' currently authorized capital structure, and its proposed capital structure, to be effective January 1, 2020. Finally, I address the issue of customer deposits.

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TABLE 1 – CURRENT AND PROPOSED AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STRUCTURE

| Capital Structure Component | Currently Authorized ¹ | Proposed 2020 | Change (basis points) |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Long-Term Debt | 45.60% | 43.60% | -200 bps |
| Preferred Equity | 2.40% | 0.40% | -200 bps |
| Common Equity | 52.00% | 56.00% | 400 bps |
| Total | 100.00% | 100.00% | |

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¹ See D.12-12-034, *mimeo*, p. 53 (Ordering Paragraph 3).

The Long-Term Debt ratio of a utility's authorized ratemaking capital structure represents a measurement of a company's financial leverage. A high Long-Term Debt ratio increases the risk of debt repayment to lenders and, all other things being equal, will result in higher costs of capital over the long-term since the utility will not be as competitive in issuing new Long-Term Debt at low costs. Conversely, a low Long-Term Debt ratio is not preferred as it does not take advantage of a tax-deductible source of financing, resulting in lower cost than equity.

Preferred Equity is a source of capital that is issued in shares and pays dividends, like Common Equity, but Preferred Equity dividends are paid at an agreed upon amount at regular intervals. Preferred Equity generally has a lower cost than Common Equity, but higher cost than Long-Term Debt. Credit rating agencies generally treat preferred stock as a hybrid of debt and equity, assigning a percentage of equity 13 content in accordance with the security's features.

The Common Equity component represents the amount of capital funded by shareholders. The Common Equity ratio reflects how a company is financing its cash needs and shows the percentage of assets on which the shareholders have a claim. A high Common Equity ratio lowers financial risk by reducing the reliance on Long-Term Debt.

In the following sections, I discuss the derivation of each of the capital structure 19 20 components: Long-Term Debt, Preferred Equity, and Common Equity.

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LONG-TERM DEBT

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A. Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt

The term "embedded costs" refer to the costs associated with the issuance and servicing of Preferred Equity or Long-Term Debt, expressed as a percentage of the net proceeds received from the issuance of that equity or debt. The embedded cost of Long-Term Debt represents all the costs (including historical costs of past Long-Term Debt issuances currently outstanding) associated with the issuance and servicing of Long-Term Debt, expressed as a percentage of the net proceeds received from Long-Term Debt issuances. As shown in Table 2, SoCalGas is proposing an embedded cost of Long-Term Debt of 4.23%.

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TABLE 2 – CURRENT AND PROPOSED AUTHORIZED EMBEDDED COSTS

| Embedded Cost | Currently | Proposed | Change |
|----------------|------------|----------|-----------------|
| Component | Authorized | 2020 | (basis points²) |
| Long-Term Debt | 4.33% | 4.23% | -10 bps |

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In Appendix A, I have included a detailed derivation of this figure. The proposed
embedded cost of Long-Term Debt is 10 basis points lower than the currently
authorized embedded cost of Long-Term Debt of 4.33%. SoCalGas proposes setting
the authorized cost of debt equal to the forecasted embedded cost of Long-Term Debt.
A summary of SoCalGas' planned Long-Term Debt issuances is shown in Table 3.

 $^{^{2}}$ A one basis point change equals a 0.01% change. A ten basis point change equals a 0.1% change. A 100 basis point change equals a 1.0% change. "Basis points" is abbreviated as bps in my tables.

TABLE 3 – FORECASTED³ LONG-TERM DEBT ISSUANCES

| Expected Issue Date | Principal | Term (years) | 30-year Treasury | Spread (bps) | Forecasted Coupon Rate |
|------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| 2019 | \$500,000,000 | 30 | 3.16% | 130 | 4.46% |
| 2020 | \$300,000,000 | 30 | 3.42% | 130 | 4.72% |

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The embedded cost of debt calculation uses the March 2019 IHS Markit Global Insight forecast of the 30-year Treasury bond yield for 2019 and 2020, plus an estimation of a SoCalGas-specific credit spread. The credit spread is estimated as the current G-spread⁴ of 110 basis points plus a concession spread of 20 basis points.⁵ The concession spread is added to reflect current market conditions. That credit spread equates to 130 basis points.

9 The Commission has stated that, "[t]he latest available interest rate forecast
10 should be used to determine embedded long-term debt and preferred stock costs in
11 ROE proceedings."⁶ In accordance with that guidance, and as it did in the prior Cost of
12 Capital proceeding (Application (A.)12-04-017), SoCalGas plans to submit an
13 embedded cost update that reflects the latest forecast as well as any changes to

³ The timing and amounts of the forecast provided herein are subject to change based on market conditions and management's discretion.

⁴ G-spread means the difference between yield on Treasury bonds and the yield on corporate bonds of the same maturity. Based on market conditions as of April 2, 2019 sourced from Bloomberg. Market conditions will be updated at a later point to reflect current conditions as part of the filing process.

⁵ New Issue Concession is the difference between the spread at which new bonds are issued and the spread at which corresponding bonds of the same issuer are traded in the secondary market. New issuance concession assumption based on recent indications from multiple banks and precedent utility transactions.

⁶ See D.07-12-049, *mimeo*, p. 33 (Conclusion of Law 33).

1 SoCalGas' Long-Term Debt forecast that may take place between the preparation of 2 this testimony and the submittal of the update.

Β. Long-Term Debt Ratio

SoCalGas is proposing an authorized Long-Term Debt ratio of 43.60%, which is a 200 basis point reduction to the currently authorized Long-Term Debt ratio of 45.60%. However, the proposed 43.60% is 113 basis points higher than the average recorded long-term debt ratio of 42.47%, as shown in Table 4.

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TABLE 4 – RECORDED LONG-TERM DEBT RATIO

| Recorded ⁷ | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2013-2018 Average | Proposed 2020 |
|-----------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|------------------|
| Long-Term Debt | 35.52% | 40.61% | 44.31% | 46.11% | 43.47% | 44.80% | 42.47% | 43.60% |

The proposed authorized Long-Term Debt ratio supports SoCalGas' expected level of capital expenditures and is intended to maintain SoCalGas' credit rating.

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1. **Capital Expenditures**

As discussed in Exhibit SCG-03 (Aragon), SoCalGas' capital expenditure forecast is expected to exceed cash flow from operations over the next five years. Over that period, SoCalGas anticipates that its capital spending will average \$1.3 billion per 16 year. SoCalGas' investment program reflects significant investments in large-scale capital projects such as the Pipeline Safety Enhancement Plan (PSEP) and pipeline 18 integrity and safety-related projects. In addition, SoCalGas has proposed significant

⁷ Represents capital structures recorded at year-end.

capital investments as part of 2019 General Rate Case (GRC)⁸ that is currently pending
 before this Commission.

As a result, SoCalGas plans to raise approximately \$500 million in 2019 and \$300 million in 2020 of new Long-Term Debt by issuing taxable first mortgage bonds to fund capital investments, as shown in Table 3.

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2. Authorized Capital Structure Should Be Credit Supportive

7 SoCalGas manages its capitalization in a manner that supports and maintains its 8 current solid "A" credit rating. An optimal capital structure supports a strong credit 9 rating, lowering borrowing costs for the utility and, ultimately, ratepayers. This optimal 10 capital structure involves a blend of Long-Term Debt and Common Equity financing. 11 Long-Term Debt is normally less expensive than Common and Preferred Equity, due to 12 its tax advantage and lower risk. However, there are limits to this benefit since a higher 13 Long-Term Debt ratio may result in a credit rating downgrade and increased financial risk.⁹ A high debt ratio increases financial risks because the fixed costs associated with 14 15 Long-Term Debt require a higher return for both debt and equity for investors, as the 16 earnings available to shareholders become more volatile and secondary to debt 17 payments.

In an environment of significant business risks, as described in Exhibit SCG-03
(Aragon), it is crucial to manage financial risk. Financial risk can be effectively
managed through the use of debt such that debt relative to total capitalization does not
exceed thresholds established by the credit rating agencies. SoCalGas' proposed

⁸ A.17-10-008.

⁹ See D.89-11-068, *mimeo*, p. 28.

capital structure aims to support and maintain its current solid "A" credit rating by
 minimizing financial risk, strengthening key credit metrics, and optimizing the use of
 debt relative to equity at levels that will ultimately minimize costs to the ratepayer.

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a. Financial Risk

The more debt a company utilizes, the greater the financial risk to both stockholders and debt holders. A rising debt-equity ratio implies that a company has growing fixed obligations to holders of securities that have precedence to revenues. As those obligations increase, more revenues must be committed to these payments, thus increasing risk to the company's initial debt holders. Similarly, the larger the revenues committed to fixed obligation payments, the greater the financial risk exposure to the common stockholders, as they are entitled only to revenues available after all fixed obligation payments are satisfied.

While the lower cost of debt relative to equity may be viewed as a way to lower a utility's cost of capital by having the utility issue more Long-Term Debt rather than equity, this can increase the financial risk to the utility. SoCalGas' proposed Long-Term Debt ratio is intended to keep financial risk low while still supporting a significant debt portfolio to help finance SoCalGas' capital expenditures.

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b. Key Credit Metrics

The major credit rating agencies commonly employ a few key metrics as a
means to quantify financial risk, such as interest coverage ratios and funds from
operations as a percent of total debt. Together with their assessment of business risk,
the major credit rating agencies use these credit metrics to help guide the credit ratings
they assign.

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The coverage ratio (CR) measures the cash from operations, or funds from operations (FFO) in a given period, available for servicing debt, measured as a ratio to total debt servicing obligations in that period. It is indicative of a company's ability to pay its annual debt servicing obligations, where a higher ratio indicates a stronger ability to service its debt, and thus lower financial risk.

FFO-to-Total Debt is another of the key metrics employed by major credit rating agencies. FFO-to-Total Debt measures FFO as a percent of total debt and indicates how much of its debt a company could retire with annual cash from operations, where a higher figure indicates a stronger ability to retire its debt, and thus lower financial risk.

In its most recent credit opinion of SoCalGas, Moody's specified a lower bound FFO-to-Total Debt of 22% for SoCalGas to avoid a downgrade from its current "A1" rating for senior unsecured debt.¹⁰ In the section titled "Factors that could lead to a downgrade," Moody's states that SoCalGas' ratings could be downgraded if:

 there is a deterioration in the utility's relationship with the Commission and/or the credit supportiveness of the California regulatory environment,

 the 2019 GRC results in inadequate rate relief or higher leverage the weakens SoCalGas' credit metrics, and/or

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• a significant decline in Sempra Energy's credit quality.

¹⁰ Source: Moody's, Credit Opinion: "Southern California Gas Company," (November 15, 2018). Moody's "A1" rating is equivalent to "A."

Under their own methodology, Standard & Poor's (S&P) specified a lower bound FFO-to-Total Debt of 13% in its most recent report on SoCalGas.¹¹ S&P also stated that SoCalGas could be downgraded if Sempra Energy's FFO-to-Total Debt falls below 16%.

These stated credit metric targets represent a lower bound as to which these metrics could move in order to sustain an "A" rating over time. SoCalGas believes it has a prudent policy to manage debt levels so that its credit metrics remain reasonably above the lower bounds presented in these analyses, in order to allow for short-term fluctuations and disruptions to credit markets and the business environment, and ultimately maintain its "A" rating for senior unsecured debt.

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c. Target Debt Ratio

Moody's explains their approach to assessing credit risk for regulated electric and gas utilities globally.¹² The report provides a detailed rating grid, which can be used as a reference tool to approximate credit profiles within the regulated electric and gas sector. Table 5 below replicates Moody's Debt Ratio benchmarks presented in the report.

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¹¹ Source: S&P, *Ratings Direct*, Research Update: "Southern California Gas Co. Ratings Affirmed; Stand-Alone Credit Profile Revised To 'a+'; Outlook Remains Negative," (October 30, 2018).

¹² Source: Moody's, "Rating Methodology for Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities," (June 23, 2017).

| Bond Rating | Debt/Capital % ¹³ |
|-------------|------------------------------|
| Aaa | <25% |
| Aa | 25% - 35% |
| А | 35% - 45% |
| Ваа | 45% - 55% |
| Ва | 55% - 65% |
| В | 65% - 75% |
| Саа | ≥75% |

TABLE 5 – Moody's Debt Ratio Benchmarks

Together with other indicators, Moody's uses the table above as a guideline for assigning a utility's credit rating. The table suggests that for SoCalGas to sustain its strong single "A" bond rating, it must maintain a debt ratio in the range of 35% - 45% which is in line with SoCalGas' proposed Long-Term Debt ratio of 43.60%.

Credit metric guidance provided by the credit rating agencies is an invaluable guide to help determine the appropriate use of debt. Debt utilization beyond the levels indicated by the target credit metrics defined above would put downward pressure on SoCalGas' "A" credit rating, as stated by Moody's.

III. PREFERRED EQUITY

A. Embedded Cost of Preferred Equity

The embedded cost of Preferred Equity represents all the costs (including historical) associated with the issuance and servicing of Preferred Equity, expressed as a percentage of the net proceeds received from Preferred Equity issuances. SoCalGas

¹³ Ratios shown are for companies that Moody's has identified to have a standard risk profile.

is proposing an embedded cost of Preferred Equity of 6.00%. Appendix B shows the
 derivation of this figure. The proposed embedded cost of Preferred Equity is
 unchanged from the currently authorized embedded cost of Preferred Equity of 6.00%.

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TABLE 6 – CURRENT AND PROPOSED AUTHORIZED EMBEDDED COSTS

| Embedded Cost | Currently | Proposed | Change |
|------------------|------------|----------|----------------|
| Component | Authorized | 2020 | (basis points) |
| Preferred Equity | 6.00% | 6.00% | 0 bps |

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SoCalGas does not anticipate the need to issue any new Preferred Equity in 2019 or 2020. Furthermore, none of SoCalGas' perpetual Preferred Equity is expected to be retired in 2019 or 2020. In the absence of any projected issuances or retirements, the forecasted embedded cost of Preferred Equity is equivalent to the current actual embedded cost of Preferred Equity.

As discussed above with respect to the embedded cost of Long-Term Debt, SoCalGas will submit an update that will reflect any changes to SoCalGas' Preferred Equity forecast that may take place between the preparation of this testimony and the submittal of the update.

B. Preferred Equity Ratio

SoCalGas is proposing an authorized Preferred Equity ratio of 0.40%, which is a 200 basis points reduction to the currently authorized Preferred Equity ratio of 2.40%. The proposed 0.40% is 202 basis points lower than the average recorded Preferred Equity ratio of 0.38%, as shown in Table 7.

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TABLE 7 – RECORDED PREFERRED EQUITY RATIO

| Recorded ¹⁴ | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2013-2018 Average | Proposed 2020 |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------------|---------------|
| Preferred Equity | 0.55% | 0.46% | 0.38% | 0.33% | 0.31% | 0.28% | 0.38% | 0.40% |

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As stated above, at this time, SoCalGas does not anticipate issuing any new or 4 retiring any Preferred Equity during this Cost of Capital cycle. Despite a downward 5 trend in bond rates, the relative cost of preferred stock has increased significantly in 6 recent years. This increase in the cost of Preferred Equity is due to a shrinking buyer 7 base that has severely limited demand for traditional institutional utility preferred stock. 8 In recent years, SoCalGas has been successful in issuing Long-Term Debt at relatively 9 low costs to fund its large capital investment plan, thus reducing the need to rely on 10 Preferred Equity. Accordingly, SoCalGas proposes reducing the authorized Preferred 11 Equity ratio to the current recorded ratio of 0.40%.

IV. COMMON EQUITY

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Α. Return on Equity

The Common Equity component varies from the Long-Term Debt and Preferred Equity components in that there is no embedded cost calculation. Instead, a Return on Equity (ROE) is developed. For 2020, SoCalGas is proposing a ROE of 10.70%, which is a 65 basis points increase from its currently authorized ROE of 10.05%. See Exhibit SCG-04 (Morin) for a full presentation of SoCalGas' ROE proposal.

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¹⁴ Represents capital structures recorded at year-end.

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Β. **Common Equity Ratio**

SoCalGas is proposing a Common Equity ratio of 56.00%, which is a 400 basis point increase to the currently authorized Common Equity ratio of 52.00%. However, the proposed 56.00% is 115 basis points lower than the average recorded Common Equity ratio of 57.15%, as shown in Table 8.

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TABLE 8 – RECORDED COMMON EQUITY RATIO

| Recorded ¹⁵ | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2013-2018 Average | Proposed 2020 |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|------------------|
| Common Equity | 63.94% | 58.93% | 55.31% | 53.56% | 56.22% | 54.92% | 57.15% | 56.00% |

SoCalGas' proposal to increase its Common Equity ratio in order to align the capital structure more closely with recorded actuals, will also help SoCalGas maintain its credit rating strength by minimizing financial risk (discussed in the Long-Term Debt section).

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1. Authorized Capital Structure Should Align with Recorded

SoCalGas is proposing an authorized capital structure that more closely aligns 14 with its average recorded capital structure. In prior decisions, the Commission adopted 15 authorized capital structures, which closely aligned with a utility's actual capital 16 structures. In the California investor-owned utilities' (IOUs) last Cost of Capital case 17 (A.12-04-015 et al.), the Commission approved San Diego Gas & Electric Company's 18 (SDG&E's) requested Common Equity ratio because it was consistent with their actual 19 Common Equity ratio:

¹⁵ Represents capital structures recorded at year-end.

In this case, SDG&E seeks a common equity ratio for its revenue requirement which is the same as its actual common equity ratio. We concur with SDG&E and find . . . [the requested] capital structure reasonable and we adopt it.¹⁶ In addition, in the 2017 proceeding for large California water utilities,¹⁷ the utilities requested capital structures that were slightly higher than their average historical capital structures. Ultimately, the Commission adopted the utilities' proposals, stating that their request was not materially different than the recent historical actual capital structures proposed by California Public Advocates (formerly Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA)):

ORA witness Dawadi arrived at his recommended capital structures by calculating the weighted average capital structures of the Applicants' regulated operations as shown in their annual reports. His recommended capital structures are not materially different from those proposed by the Applicants . . . Therefore, we adopt the applicants' proposed capital structures.¹⁸

SoCalGas believes that its proposal for a 56.00% Common Equity ratio better
aligns its authorized capital structure with recent historically recorded actuals and is
supported by Commission precedent.

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¹⁸ D.17-04-001, *mimeo*, p. 21.

¹⁶ D.12-12-034 at 11.

¹⁷ See A.17-04-001 et al.

2. Authorized Equity Ratios of Comparable Natural Gas Utilities

As a benchmark, SoCalGas evaluates its authorized capital structure relative to the authorized capital structure of other comparable natural gas utilities. SoCalGas has identified 9 proxy companies with 27 subsidiaries, as shown in Appendix D.¹⁹ Of this proxy group, SoCalGas has identified 13 recent regulatory decisions from 2018 in 11 states, that have authorized the ratemaking capital structure for comparable utilities offering natural gas services. Table 9 shows the authorized Common Equity ratios for these comparable utilities.

TABLE 9 – RECENT AUTHORIZED²⁰ COMMON EQUITY RATIOS FOR

| Natural Gas Utility | State | Previously Authorized Common Equity Ratio | Currently Authorized Common Equity Ratio | Date |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Atmos Energy of Colorado | со | 52.57% | 55.58% | 04/04/18 |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | ΚY | 49.16% | 52.57% | 05/03/18 |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | ΤN | 53.00% | 51.40% | 12/04/18 |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | MS | 53.00% | 54.69% | 11/01/18 |
| Atmos Energy Corp., West Texas Division | тх | N/A | 58.00% | 10/01/18 |
| Atmos Energy Corp., Mid Texas Division | ТХ | 55.00% | 58.00% | 10/01/18 |
| Spire Inc. | MO | 55.00% | 54.20% | 02/21/18 |

COMPARABLE NATURAL GAS UTILITIES

¹⁹ Pursuant D.17-07-005, SoCalGas has provided a comparison of SoCalGas' currently authorized capital structure to other utilities nationally and to other California energy IOUs in Appendix D.

²⁰ Authorized ratios were established through a Cost of Capital, rate case, or other applicable proceeding that received a decision in 2018.

| Northwest Natural Gas Co. – OR | OR | 50.00% | 50.00% | 10/26/18 |
|--------------------------------------|----|--------|--------|----------|
| Southwest Gas Corp. – NV | NV | 42.74% | 49.66% | 12/21/18 |
| Northern IN Public Service Co. | IN | 58.80% | 56.02% | 09/19/18 |
| Columbia Gas of Kentucky | KY | 52.42% | 52.42% | 12/05/18 |
| Bay State Gas Company | MA | 53.54% | 53.25% | 09/05/18 |
| Columbia Gas of Maryland | MD | 54.29% | 52.34% | 10/02/18 |
| Average | | 52.46% | 53.70% | |

On average, these comparable utilities were recently authorized Common Equity ratios of 53.70%. This represents an increase of 124 basis points over the group's previously authorized average Common Equity ratio of 52.46% indicating multiple jurisdictions recognize the need to strengthen utility balance sheets.

3. Impact of Tax Reform

The recently enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 has created a potential for negative impact on utility credit ratings. A recent article from S&P highlights some of the actual impact that the TCJA had on utilities in 2018:

The impact of tax reform on utilities is likely to be negative to varying degrees depending on a company's tax position going into 2018, how its regulators react, and how the company reacts in turn. It is negative for credit quality because the combination of a lower tax rate and the loss of stimulus provisions related to bonus depreciation or full expensing of capital spending will create headwinds in operating cash-flow generation capabilities as customer rates are lowered in response

to the new tax code . . . Regulators must also recognize that tax reform
 is a strain on utility credit quality, and we expect companies to request
 stronger capital structures and other means to offset some of the
 negative impact . . . More equity may make sense and be necessary to
 protect ratings if financial metrics are already under pressure and
 regulators are aggressive in lowering customer rates.²¹
 This industry-wide negative impact alone warrants an increase in all utility capital
 structures to offset the loss of benefits such as bonus depreciation and less cash flow
 from customer rates. A recent article from S&P highlights some of the actual impact
 that the TCJA had on utilities in 2018:
 The RRA-calculated effective income tax rate for our energy and water

The RRA-calculated effective income tax rate for our energy and water coverage universe declined significantly during 2018 to 11.6% from 34.7%. This 67% decline can reasonably be attributed to the enactment of tax reform legislation in December 2017 . . . [T]he [natural] gas group saw the largest relative decline in the effective tax rate [with] 72% . . . [T]ax expense declined by 49.3% in 2018 to \$5.430 billion. The gas subgroup saw the largest percentage decline of 87.8% to \$81.4 million.²²

19 potentially lower credit metrics. Overall, the negative impact of the TCJA from a cash

Generally, less cash flow from customer rates will result in lower credit ratios and

²¹ Source: S&P, "U.S. Tax Reform: For Utilities' Credit Quality, Challenges Abound," (January 24, 2018).

²² Source: S&P, "FINANCIAL FOCUS - Effective utility tax rate shows major decline in 2018; taxes paid increased," (March 26, 2019).

flow perspective is a reduction in revenue requirement, with no reduction in the cost of both equity and debt capital. According to Moody's, the average reduction in the ratio of cash flow to debt for utilities due to the TCJA is 150 – 250 basis points.²³ Although the magnitude of the impact varies for each company depending on their tax position before the reform, the impact of the TCJA is another factor SoCalGas considered when proposing a 56.00% Common Equity ratio.

V. CUSTOMER DEPOSITS

A. Background

In SoCalGas' 2019 GRC proceeding, SoCalGas' customer deposits request was
the subject of litigation as part of its working cash proposal. During the course of that
litigation, there were arguments that one possible venue for determining the ratemaking
treatment of customer deposits could be the Cost of Capital proceeding. While the
Commission has not made any ruling or determination on this point, the topic is covered
here because SoCalGas was one of the parties that supported addressing customer
deposits in the Cost of Capital.²⁴

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B. SoCalGas' Current Treatment of Customer Deposits

Customer deposits are funds collected from customers for security against nonpayment that will be returned to those same customers if bills are paid timely or used as a credit against their bills in the event of non-payment. SoCalGas pays interest at the

²³ Source: Moody's, "Moody's Changes Outlook on 25 Regulated Utilities Primarily Impacted by Tax Reform," (January 19, 2018). The average reflects bonus depreciation and the impact on cash flow and financing of both new and pre-existing assets.

 ²⁴ See A.17-10-007/008, Reply Brief of Southern California Gas Company and San Diego Gas
 & Electric Company in the Test Year 2019 General Rate Case (October 12, 2018), p. 427.

Federal Reserve published prime non-financial 3-month commercial paper rate on these
 balances.

Historically, SoCalGas has consistently treated of customer deposits as directed in the Commission's Standard Practice (SP) U-16 whereby interest-bearing accounts are excluded from working cash. SoCalGas is requesting continuation of the same methodology it has advocated in past GRCs. SP U-16 states that "[o]nly non-interest bearing customer deposits are to be considered."²⁵

8 The Commission has stated its preference for consistency under SP U-16: "[a]s 9 a general matter, however, we presume that ratemaking treatment consistent with SP 10 U-16 should be deemed reasonable, especially where there are no special circumstances that justify a deviation."²⁶ As there are no such special circumstances 11 12 here, there is no need to make changes to SoCalGas' long-standing treatment. 13 Including ratepayer money (customer deposits) as a form of Long-Term Debt would be 14 inconsistent with the fact that substantially larger amounts of shareholder-provided 15 balances such as net balancing account under collections, which receive the same 16 interest rate are excluded from Long-Term Debt and rate base. There is no logical 17 reason to make an exception for one interest-bearing account (customer deposits) from 18 SP U-16.

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C. Customer Deposits Should Not Impact Capital Structure

In addition to SoCalGas' working cash position, SoCalGas would also consider inclusion of customer deposits in a utility's authorized capital structure (as determined in

- ²⁵ Standard Practice U-16, Chapter 3, Section 22.
- ²⁶ D.14-08-032, *mimeo*, p. 628.

Cost of Capital proceedings) as equally inconsistent with SP U-16. Because customer
 deposits are essentially earning a short-term debt rate, it is the equivalent of short-term
 debt, and should therefore be excluded from a utility's ratemaking capital structure.

Long-term financing provides a static, dependable source of funds with known maturity dates. By contrast, the customer deposit balances can fluctuate and are not permanent in nature, thus lacking the same characteristics as long-term financing.

Financial principles provide that short-term assets should be financed with shortterm liabilities and long-term assets should be financed with long-term liabilities. Customer deposits are short-term and refunded after 12 months. Therefore, customer deposits should not be included as part of Long-Term Debt in SoCalGas' capital structure which would be used to finance long-term assets, such as rate base assets.

Moreover, the Commission has stated that "balancing accounts and customer deposits should both earn the short-term debt rate."²⁷ By stating that customer deposits should earn a short-term debt rate, the Commission has effectively distinguished customer deposits as shorter-term liabilities.

16 **VI**.

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COMMISSION QUESTIONS

In D.17-07-005, the Commission directed the California IOUs to address eight specific questions in testimony. Questions 4 and 5 will be addressed here.

Question 4 states:

How has the utility's recorded capital structure changed since the 2013 Cost of Capital application? How has the recorded capital structure compared to authorized capital structure over this time period?

²⁷ D.14-08-032, *mimeo*, p. 630.

SoCalGas' annual recorded capital structure for the period of 2013 – 2018 has been presented in Tables 4, 7, and 8 of my testimony. It may also be found in Appendix C. As stated above, the recorded capital structure has had a higher Common Equity ratio and lower Long-Term Debt and Preferred Equity ratios than authorized.

Question 5 states:

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How does the utility's current capital structure compare to other utilities nationally and to other California utilities? Include separate comparisons for vertically integrated and non-vertically integrated utilities.

As shown in Appendix D, SoCalGas has performed a comparison of both authorized and recently recorded capital structure with a group of 9 comparable proxy companies with 26 subsidiaries across 19 states which SoCalGas has identified as comparable peer utilities. All utilities in the proxy group are non-vertically integrated.

In response to the California comparison portion of Question 5, SoCalGas has
provided both the authorized and recent recorded capital structures for several
California utilities, which include water and combined gas and electric utilities, in
Appendix D. However, Southwest Gas Corporation is the only gas-only California utility
that qualifies as a comparable proxy company.²⁸ Comparing SoCalGas' capital
structure to any of the other California utilities listed would not be particularly relevant as
they are not comparable proxy companies.

²⁸ Per Exhibit SCG-04 (Morin), p. 27, SoCalGas has defined comparable proxy companies to be "investment-grade dividend-paying natural gas utilities contained in Value Line's natural gas distribution utility group.

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VII. CONCLUSION

SoCalGas' comprehensive authorized capital structure proposal will support a solid credit rating, as well as its ability to manage financial and business risk. The proposal has support in financial data of historically recorded company actuals, Commission precedent, and comparable national gas utilities. A total snapshot of SoCalGas' proposal is depicted in Table 10.

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TABLE 10 – PROPOSED EMBEDDED COSTS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE

| Component | Proposed Embedded Costs | Proposed Capital Structure |
|------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Long-Term Debt | 4.23% | 43.60% |
| Preferred Equity | 6.00% | 0.40% |
| Common Equity | 10.70% | 56.00% |
| Total | | 100.00% |

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SoCalGas believes that its request is closely aligned with its recent recorded
capital structure and will allow SoCalGas to maintain a strong "A" credit rating. Viewed
in its entirety, the proposed capital structure will support SoCalGas' access to markets
during the anticipated period of significant capital expenditures, thereby providing
ratepayers with lower capital costs over the long term. Finally, SoCalGas does not
believe that its authorized capital structure should be encumbered by customer
deposits, which is the functional equivalent of short-term debt.

This concludes my prepared direct testimony.

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VIII. WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS

My name is Ricardo Gonzalez. My business address is 555 West 5th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90013.

4 I am currently employed by SoCalGas as the Utility Accounting Manager. My 5 responsibilities include managing the month-end close process, supporting the 6 company's SEC filings, and SOX compliance of our internal controls over financial 7 reporting. Prior to my current role, I was the Financial Planning Manager responsible 8 for the company's financial planning and analysis function. In this role, I also managed 9 our cash forecasting and financing plans. I have been employed by SoCalGas since 10 2003 and have held numerous roles of increasing responsibility primarily within the 11 Accounting Operations and Financial & Operational Planning departments.

I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration with an
emphasis in Finance from California State University, Northridge in 2002. I also
received a Master of Business Administration degree with an emphasis in Global
Business from the Graziadio School of Business and Management at Pepperdine
University in 2010. I am a Certified Public Accountant in the State of California and a
Certified Management Accountant.

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I have not previously testified before this Commission.

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APPENDIX A

Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt

Southern California Gas Company

Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt

(figures in dollars unless otherwise stated)

| | | Α | В | С | D | E |
|--------|------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|
| | | | Total Discounts | | | |
| | | | and Expenses | Net Proceeds | Total Annual Cost | Effective Rate |
| Line # | Description | Principal | | (C = A - B) | | (E = D / C) |
| 1 | Series R (1) | | 616,334 | (616,334) | 204,560 | -33.19% |
| 2 | Series T (2) | | 1,023,654 | (1,023,654) | 318,878 | -31.15% |
| 3 | Series Y (5) | | 612,348 | (612,348) | 309,198 | -50.49% |
| 4 | Series BB (5) | | 350,856 | (350,856) | 116,926 | -33.33% |
| 5 | Series DD (5) | | 705,324 | (705,324) | 219,678 | -31.15% |
| 6 | Series EE (5) | | 434,729 | (434,729) | 88,340 | -20.32% |
| 7 | Swiss Francs | 4,338,770 | 0 | 4,338,770 | 81,352 | 1.88% |
| 8 | Medium term Note | 5,000,000 | 0 | 5,000,000 | 283,500 | 5.67% |
| 9 | Series KK (CPCFA91A) | 250,000,000 | 3,960,222 | 246,039,778 | 14,507,007 | 5.90% |
| 10 | Series MM | 300,000,000 | 3,816,052 | 296,183,948 | 15,502,202 | 5.23% |
| 11 | SERIES NN | 350,000,000 | 5,478,830 | 344,521,170 | 13,307,628 | 3.86% |
| 12 | SERIES OO | 250,000,000 | 43,939,736 | 206,060,264 | 12,143,215 | 5.89% |
| 13 | SERIES PP | 500,000,000 | 5,973,758 | 494,026,242 | 16,347,376 | 3.31% |
| 14 | SERIES RR | 350,000,000 | 3,456,594 | 346,543,406 | 11,546,005 | 3.33% |
| 15 | SERIES TT | 500,000,000 | 5,229,164 | 494,770,836 | 13,525,544 | 2.73% |
| 16 | SERIES UU | 400,000,000 | 4,575,075 | 395,424,925 | 16,652,502 | 4.21% |
| 17 | SERIES VV | 550,000,000 | 5,769,326 | 544,230,674 | 23,842,311 | 4.38% |
| 18 | Revolving line of Credit | | | | 386,964 | |
| 19 | Total Outstanding (12/31/2018) | 3,459,338,770 | 85,942,001 | 3,373,396,769 | 139,383,187 | 4.13% |
| 20 | | | | | | |
| 21 | Changes During 2019 | | | | | |
| 22 | 30 year in Q2, 2019, 130 bps,4.46% | 500,000,000 | 5,553,798 | 494,446,202 | 22,468,505 | 4.54% |
| 23 | Revolving Line of Credit | | | | 31,672 | |
| 24 | Total Changes During 2019 | 500,000,000 | 5,553,798 | 494,446,202 | 22,500,178 | |
| 25 | Total Outstanding (12/31/2019) | 3,959,338,770 | 91,495,799 | 3,867,842,971 | 161,883,365 | 4.19% |
| 26 | | | | | | |
| 27 | Changes During 2020 | | | | | |
| 28 | 30 year in Q2, 2020, 130 bps,4.72% | 300,000,000 | 3,550,896 | 296,449,104 | 14,275,809 | 4.82% |
| 29 | Revolving Line of Credit | | | | 15,836 | |
| 30 | Total Changes During 2020 | 300,000,000 | 3,550,896 | 296,449,104 | 14,291,646 | |
| 31 | Total Outstanding (12/31/2020) | 4,259,338,770 | 95,046 <u>,</u> 694 | 4,164,292,076 | 176,175,010 | 4.23% |
| 32 | | | | | | |
| 33 | F | orecasted 2020 | Embedded Cost o | of Long-Term De | bt | 4.23% |

Forecasted 2020 Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt

Southern California Gas Company Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt Detail (figures in dollars unless otherwise stated)

| DFD CHG And Swap (Net of X300xx Annual Amortization Total Discounts Line # Description Base Date Bond Principal Discount saue Lock sense Lock chechdles Total Discounts and Expense swap lock Discount Expense Expense Lock and Expense swap lock Discount Expense Expense Lock and Expense swap lock Discount Expense Expense Lock and Expense Swap lock Discount Expense Expense Expense Expense Expense Lock Annual Annu | P |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| AC 1330xx Swap (Net of 1ax) I for a biscounts interest expense expense for a biscount interest expense expense expense and Expense and Expense and Expense interest expense expense <td></td> | |
| Line # Description Issue Date Body Principal Discount Expense Termination Less on React. Less on React. <thless on="" react.<="" th=""> Less on React. <thl< td=""><td>and Expenses</td></thl<></thless> | and Expenses |
| 1 Series R (1) 03/01/86 03/01/16 616.334 616.334 204,560 2 Series R (2) 12/01/86 12/01/16 1,023,654 1,023,854 318,878 3 Series B (3) 03/01/93 03/01/23 612,348 612,348 309,198 309,198 4 Series B (3) 03/01/93 03/01/23 350,856 350,856 350,856 116,926 5 Series EE (3) 11/01/93 110/125 705,324 705,324 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 <t< th=""><th></th></t<> | |
| $ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | ,560 204,560 |
| $ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | ,878 318,878 |
| 4 Series BB (3) 03/01/39 03/01/29 350,856 350,856 350,856 116,926 116,926 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 219,678 | ,198 309,198 |
| 5 Series DD (3) 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/33 06/15/34 06/15/34 06/15/34 0 | ,926 116,926 |
| 6 Series EE (3) 11/01/33 11/01/25 5 5 434,729 434,729 434,729 - - 88,340 7 Swiss Francs Bond 1875% 05/14/16 10.0 4,338,770 0 0 - - 81,352 - - - 9 Series KK 5.750% 11/18/05 11/15/03 01/18/28 25.0 5,000,000 1,520,000 - - 283,500 - - - 283,500 - - - 283,500 - - - - 283,500 - - - - 283,500 - - - - - 283,500 - - - - - 283,500 - - - - 283,500 - - - - - 283,500 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | ,678 219,678 |
| 7 Swiss France Bond 1.875% 05/14/06 06/14/16 10.0 4,338,770 0 0 - - 81,322 - - - - 123,500 - - - - - 123,500 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - < | ,340 88,340 |
| 8 Medium term Note 570% 01/15/03 01/18/28 25.0 5,000,000 2,40,222 - - - 28,000 25,0667 81,341 14,4 9 Series KK 5,750% 11/18/05 11/18/05 300,000,000 729,000 3,087,052 - - 3,960,222 14,375,000 24,300 102,902 15,5 10 Series MM 5,125% 11/18/10 11/18/10 300,000,000 729,000 3,087,052 - 3,816,052 13,25,000 58,217 12,4411 13,3 12 SERIES NN 3,750% 09/11/12 09/15/42 30.0 250,000,000 1,715,00 2,68,436 39,753,800 - 5,973,758 11,125,000 878,684 56,83 88,948 12,2,113 SERIES PP 3,150% 09/11/14 09/15/24 10.0 500,000,000 829,500 2,627,994 - 5,973,758 15,750,000 183,000 414,376 16,55 14 SERIES PP 3,150% 08/13/14 09 | 81,352 |
| 9 Series KK 57.50% 11/18/05 11/15/13 30.0 250,000,000 1,520,000 2,440,222 - 3,960,222 14,375,000 50,667 81,341 14,4 10 Series MM 5,125% 11/16/40 300,000,000 729,000 3,087,052 3,816,052 15,375,000 56,667 81,341 14,3 11 SERIES NN 3,750% 09/21/12 09/15/42 30.0 300,000,000 729,000 3,087,052 - 5,478,830 13,125,000 58,217 124,411 13,3 12 SERIES NO 4,450% 03/13/14 03/15/44 30.0 2,668,436 39,753,800 - 43,939,756 11,25,000 58,814 50,583 88,948 12,7 13 SERIES PP 3,150% 09/11/14 09/15/24 10.0 50,000,000 1,513,000 - 5,73,758 15,750,000 88,048 50,583 88,948 12,7 14 SERIES PP 3,150% 09/11/14 09/15/24 10.0 50, | 283,500 |
| 10 Series MM 5.125% 11/16/10 11/15/40 30.0 0.000,000 729,000 3,087,052 3,816,052 15,375,000 24,300 102,902 15,1 11 SERIES NN 3,750% 09/21/12 09/15/42 30.0 350,000,000 1,746,500 3,732,330 - 5,478,830 13,125,000 582,17 124,411 13,12 12 SERIES PO 4,450% 03/13/4 03/15/44 30.0 250,000,000 1,517,500 2,688,43 39,753,800 - 4,593,738 11,125,000 878,684 50,583 88,948 12,7 13 SERIES PP 3,150% 09/11/4 09/15/2 10.0 500,000,000 1,830,000 4,143,758 - 5,973,758 15,750,000 183,000 414,376 16, 14 SERIES PP 3,100 66/15/26 10.0 500,000,000 829,500 2,627,094 - 5,973,758 15,750,000 183,000 414,376 16, 15 SERIES TT 2,600% 66/15/26 10.0 500,000,000 420,000 4,259,164 - 5,229,1 | 14,507,007 |
| 11 SERIES NN 37,50% 09/21/12 09/15/42 30.0 350,000,000 1,746,500 3,732,330 - 5,478,830 13,125,000 58,217 12,4411 13; 12 SERIES PP 3,150% 09/11/14 03/15/44 30.0 250,000,000 1,517,500 2,688,436 39,753,800 - 43,939,736 11,125,000 878,684 50,583 88,948 12; 13 SERIES PP 3,150% 09/11/14 09/15/24 10.0 500,000,000 1,830,00 4,143,758 - 5,973,758 15,750,000 183,000 414,376 16; 14 SERIES PR 3,200% 06/13/15 06/15/25 10.0 500,000,000 829,500 2,627,994 - 3,456,594 11,200,000 83,033 26,2972 11,5 15 SERIES TT 2,600% 06/15/26 10.0 500,000,000 829,500 2,627,994 - 5,229,164 13,000,000 97,474 28,057 13,5 15 SERIES TT 2,600% 06/15/26 0,000 0,000 420,000 4,25,075 - | 15,502,202 |
| 12 SERIES OO 4.450% 03/13/4 03/14 03/0 250,000,000 1,517,500 2,668,436 39,753,800 - 43,939,736 11,125,000 878,684 50,583 88,948 12, 13 SERIES PP 3,150% 09/11/14 00/15/24 10.0 500,000,000 1,830,000 41,43,758 - 5,973,758 11,25,50,000 18,30.00 41,43,76 16, 14 SERIES RR 3,200% 06/13/41 00/15/24 10.0 500,000,000 829,500 2,627,094 - 3,456,594 11,20,000 83,033 26,2972 11,4 15 SERIES IT 2,600% 06/03/16 06/15/26 10.0 500,000,000 970,000 4,259,164 - 5,229,164 13,000,000 97,487 428,057 13,43,007 13,43,007 13,45,052 14,407 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,4376 14,437 | 13,307,628 |
| 13 SERIES PP 3.10% 09/11/14 09/15/24 10.0 500,000,000 1,830,000 4,143,758 - 5.973,758 15,750,000 183,000 414,376 16; 14 SERIES RR 3.20% 06/18/15 06/15/25 10.0 350,000,000 829,500 2,627,094 - 3,456,594 11,200,000 83,033 262,972 11,1 15 SERIES TT 2,60% 06/16/578 06/15/26 10.0 500,000,000 970,000 4,259,164 - 5,229,164 13,200,000 97,47 428,057 13,30 16 SERIES UU 4,125% 05/15/18 06/10/14 30.0 400,000,000 420,000 4,155,075 - 4,575,075 16,500,000 14,000 138,502 16,600 17 OEDE V/V 4100 130,000 07,000 4,155,075 - 4,575,075 16,500,000 14,000 138,502 16,600 17 OEDE V/V 4100 130,000 14,000 138,502 16,600 14,000 138,502 16,600 16,600 16,600 16,600 16 | 12,143,215 |
| 14 SERIES RR 3.200% 06/18/15 06/15/25 10.0 350,000,000 829,500 2.627,094 - 3.456,594 11.200,000 83.033 262,972 11.1 15 SERIES IT 2.60% 06/13/67 06/15/26 10.0 500,000,000 970,000 4.259,164 - 5.229,164 13.000,000 97.487 428,057 13.3 16 SERIES UU 4.125% 06/15/18 06/10/148 3.00 400,000,000 420,000 4,155,075 - 4,575,075 16,500,000 14,000 138,502 16,600,000 | 16,347,376 |
| 15 SERIES TT 2.600% 06/03/16 06/15/26 10.0 500,000,000 970,000 4,259,164 - 5,229,164 13,000,000 97,487 428,057 13,1 16 SERIES UU 4,125% 05/15/18 06/01/148 30.0 400,000,000 420,000 4,155,075 - 4,575,075 16,000,000 14,000 138,502 16,000 17 OEDEV/V 000/00,000 420,000 4,155,075 - 4,575,075 16,000,000 14,000 138,502 16,000 | 11,546,005 |
| 16 SERIES UU 4,125% 05/15/18 06/01/48 30.0 400,000,000 420,000 4,155,075 - 4,575,075 16,500,000 14,000 138,502 16, | 13,525,544 |
| | 16,652,502 |
| 17 SERIES VV 4.300% 09/24/18 01/15/49 30.0 SS0,000,000 247,500 S,521,826 - S,769,326 23,650,000 8,250 184,061 23,6 | 23,842,311 |
| 18 Revolving line of Credit 386,964 | 386,964 |
| 19 Total Outstanding (12/31/2018) 3,459,338,770 9,810,000 32,634,956 39,753,800 3,743,245 85,942,001 134,851,816 878,684 569,537 1,825,571 1,257,580 139,7 | ,580 139,383,187 |
| 20 | |
| 21 Forecast of GI Spread Issuance Underwriting Annual Annual Total Ar | Total Annual |
| 22 <u>New Issuances Coupon Forecast (bps) Term Principal Fees Underwriting fees (bps) Total Fees Interest Fees Expen</u> | Expenses |
| 23 New Issuance in 2019 4.457% 3.157% 130 30 500,000,000 1,178,798 4,375,000 87.5 5,553,798 22,283,379 185,127 22,4 | 22,468,505 |
| 24 Revolving Line of Credit (4) 31,672 | 31,672 |
| 25 New Issuance in 2020 4.719% 3.419% 130 30 300,000,000 925,896 2,625,000 87.5 3,550.896 14,157,446 118,363 14,250,250,250,250,250,250,250,250,250,250 | 14,275,809 |
| 26 Revolving Line of Credit (4) 15,836 | 15,836 |
| 27 | |
| 28 | |
| 29 (1) Series R - refunded by Series BB and DD and amortized over the life of Series BB and DD. | |
| 30 (2) Series T - refunded by Series DD and amortized over life of Series DD. | |
| 31 (3) These bond series are being amortized over the remaining life of the original bond issuance at the time of reacquisition. | |
| 32 (4) Basis point spread is forecasted based on the current G-spread as of April 2, 2019 plus a concession spread of 20 bps in an effort to reflect current market conditions. | |

Southern California Gas Company Forecasted Issuance Cost Summary Taxable First Mortgage 30 Year Bonds (figures in dollars unless otherwise stated)

<u>2019</u> 2020 500,000,000 300,000,000 Principal issued **Up-Front Costs:** Underwriter (1) 4,375,000 2,625,000 **Issuance Fees:** Legal 112,387 114,792 Printing 20,397 20,833 Rating agency (2) 396,000 660,000 Trustee 37,225 38,021 Auditor 45,893 46,875 CPUC 228,446 233,333 SEC 74,449 76,042 Total Issuance Fees 1,178,798 925,896 **Total Up-Front Costs** 3,550,896 5,553,798

(1) Based on 87.5 bps of principal issuance

(2) Based on 13.2 bps of principal issuance

APPENDIX B

Embedded Cost of Preferred Equity

Embedded Cost of Preferred Equity (figures in dollars unless otherwise stated)

| Funding Type | Class/ Series | Prices (\$) | Dividend Rate (%) | Amount Outstanding (\$000) | Shares Outstanding |
|------------------|------------------|----------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Preferred Equity | A | \$27.50 | 6.00% | \$19,575 | 783,032 |
| Preferred Equity | - | \$30.00 | 6.00% | \$1,975 | 79,011 |
| We | eighted Ave | 6.00% | \$21,550 | | |

APPENDIX C

Historically Recorded Capital Structures Compared to Authorized

| Recorded Capital Structures ¹ | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2013-2018 Average | Authorized Capital Structure | | | |
| Long- Term Debt | 35.52% | 40.61% | 44.31% | 46.11% | 43.47% | 44.80% | 42.47% | 45.60% | | | |
| Preferred Stock | 0.55% | 0.46% | 0.38% | 0.33% | 0.31% | 0.28% | 0.38% | 2.40% | | | |
| Common Equity | 63.94% | 58.93% | 55.31% | 53.56% | 56.22% | 54.92% | 57.15% | 52.00% | | | |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | | |

Historically Recorded Capital Structures Compared to Authorized

¹ Represents capital structures recorded at year-end. These percentages are rounded to the hundredth decimal point. In the event they do not add up to 100.00%, it is due to rounding.

APPENDIX D

Non-California and California Utilities' Capital Structures

Non-California Utilities' Capital Structure

| | | Authorized Ratios | | Recently Recorded Ratios ² | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------|-------|-------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|----------|
| | | Common | Long-Term Debt/ Preferred | Effective | Case Identification | Common | Long-Term Debt/ Preferred | Current |
| Company ¹ | State | Equity | Equity | Date | Number | Equity | Equity | As of |
| Atmos Energy | T | Г | 1 | 1 | T | | | |
| Atmos Energy of Colorado | CO | 55.58% | 44.42% | 04/04/18 | 17AL-0429G | | | |
| Atmos Energy | KS | | | 02/27/18 | 18-ATMG-218-TAR (GSRS) | | | |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | KY | 52.57% | 47.43% | 05/03/18 | 2017-00349 | | | |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | TN | 51.40% | 48.60% | 12/04/18 | 18-00067 | | | |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | MS | 54.69% | 45.31% | 11/01/18 | 2005-UN-0503 | | | |
| Atmos Energy Corp., West Texas Division | тх | 58.00% | 42.00% | 10/01/18 | N/A | | | |
| Atmos Energy Corp., Mid Texas Division | тх | 58.00% | 42.00% | 10/01/18 | N/A | | | |
| Spire Energy | | | | | | | | |
| Spire Energy | MO | 54.20% | 45.80% | 02/21/18 | GR-2017-0215 | 57.20% | 42.80% | 12/31/18 |
| Northwest Natural Gas Co. | | | | | | | | |
| Northwest Natural Gas Co OR | OR | 50.00% | 50.00% | 10/26/18 | UG-344 | | | |
| Northwest Natural Gas Co WA | WA | 50.74% | 49.26% | 12/26/08 | UG-08-0546 | | | |
| South Jersey Industries | | | | | | | | |
| South Jersey Gas | NJ | 52.50% | 47.50% | 10/20/17 | GR-17010071 | 53.01% | 46.99% | 12/31/18 |
| Elizabethtown Gas | NJ | 46.00% | 54.00% | 06/30/17 | GR-16090826 | | | |
| Southwest Gas | | | | | | | | |
| Southwest Gas Corp AZ | AR | 51.70% | 48.30% | 04/11/17 | G-01551A-16-0107 | | | |
| Southwest Gas Corp NV | NV | 49.66% | 50.34% | 12/21/18 | 18-05031 | | | |
| New Jersey Resources | | | | | | | | |
| New Jersey Natural Gas Co. | NJ | 52.50% | 47.50% | 09/23/16 | GR15111304 | 60.65% | 41.20% | 12/31/17 |
| NISource | | | | | | | | |
| Northern IN Public Service Co. | IN | 56.02% | 43.98% | 09/19/18 | 44988 | 58.60% | 41.40% | 12/31/17 |
| Columbia Gas of Ohio | ОН | | | 12/03/08 | C-08-0072-GA-AIR | 50.07% | 49.93% | 12/31/17 |
| Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania | PA | | | 12/06/18 | R-2018-2647577 | 54.04% | 45.96% | 12/31/17 |
| Columbia Gas of Virginia | VA | 38.13% | 61.87% | 03/17/17 | PUE-2016-00033 | 43.15% | 56.85% | 12/31/17 |
| Columbia Gas of Kentucky | KΥ | 52.42% | 47.58% | 12/05/18 | C-2018-00341 (AMRP) | 53.76% | 46.24% | 12/31/17 |
| Bay State Gas Company | MA | 53.25% | 46.75% | 09/05/18 | D.P.U. 18-45 | 61.19% | 38.81% | 12/31/17 |
| Columbia Gas of Maryland | MD | 52.34% | 47.66% | 10/02/18 | 9480 | 54.06% | 45.94% | 12/31/17 |
| ONE Gas | | | | | | | | |
| Kansas Gas Service Co. | KS | | | 02/05/19 | 18-KGSG-560-RTS | 63.35% | 36.65% | 12/31/17 |
| Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. | OK | 60.50% | 39.50% | 01/06/16 | PUD201500213 | 62.13% | 37.87% | 12/31/16 |
| Texas Gas Service Co. | ТΧ | 60.10% | 39.90% | 09/27/16 | 10506 | 63.01% | 36.99% | 12/31/17 |
| UGI | | | | | | | | |
| UGI Utilities Inc. | PA | | | 09/01/16 | R-2015-2518438 | 55.74% | 44.26% | 12/31/17 |
| Southern California Gas Company | СА | 52.00% | 48.00% | 12/26/12 | 12-12-034 | 54.92% ³ | 45.08% ³ | 12/31/18 |

¹ All Companies shown are non-vertically integrated. ² Based on 2018 10-K or most recent filed FERC Form 2. Total capitalization excludes short-term debt.

³Represents the actual ratemaking capital structure.

| | | Authorized Ratios | | | | Recent | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Company | State | Common Equity | Long-Term Debt/ Preferred Equity | Effective Date | Case Identification Number | Common Equity | Long-Term Debt/ Preferred Equity | Current As of | Vertically Integrated? |
| California-American Water Company | CA | 55.39% | 44.61% | 03/22/18 | 18-03-035 | | | | Yes |
| California Water Service Company | CA | 53.40% | 46.60% | 03/22/18 | 18-03-035 | 44.75% | 55.25% | 12/31/18 | Yes |
| Golden State Water Company | CA | 57.00% | 43.00% | 03/22/18 | 18-03-035 | 61.04% | 38.96% | 12/31/18 | Yes |
| Great Oaks Water Company | CA | 70.00% | 30.00% | 12/20/18 | 18-12-002 | | | | Yes |
| Liberty Utilities (Park Water/Apple Valley Ranch Water) | CA | 57.00% | 43.00% | 12/20/18 | 18-12-002 | | | | Yes |
| Pacific Gas & Electric | CA | 52.00% | 48.00% | 12/26/12 | 12-12-034 | 41.23% | 58.77% | 12/31/18 | Yes |
| San Diego Gas & Electric | CA | 52.00% | 48.00% | 12/26/12 | 12-12-034 | 56.15% ² | 43.85% ² | 12/31/18 | Yes |
| San Gabriel Valley Water Company | CA | 64.46% | 35.54% | 12/20/18 | 18-12-002 | | | | Yes |
| San Jose Water Company | CA | 53.28% | 46.72% | 03/22/18 | 18-03-035 | | | | Yes |
| Southern California Edison | CA | 48.00% | 52.00% | 12/26/12 | 12-12-034 | 47.53% | 52.47% | 12/31/18 | Yes |
| Southwest Gas Corp CA | CA | 55.00% | 45.00% | 06/12/14 | 12-12-024 | | | | No |
| Suburban Water Systems | CA | 60.00% | 40.00% | 12/20/18 | 18-12-002 | | | | Yes |

California Utilities' Capital Structure

| Southern California Gas Company CA | 52.00% | 48.00% | 12/26/12 | 12-12-034 | 54.92% | 45.08% | 12/31/18 | No |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------|-----------|--------|--------|----------|----|
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------|-----------|--------|--------|----------|----|

¹Based on 2018 10-K. Total capitalization excludes short-term debt.

 $^{2}\,\mbox{Represents the actual ratemaking capital structure.}$